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Abstract 
 
Security of data is critical to the operations of firms. Without the ability to store, process and transmit 
data securely, operations may be compromised, with the potential for serious consequences to trading 
integrity. Thus the role that electronically-mediated working plays in business today and its 
dependency on data security is of critical interest, especially in light of the fact that much of this 
communication is based on the use of open networks (i.e. the Internet). This paper discusses findings 
from a ‘WestFocus’ survey on electronically-mediated working and telework amongst a sample of 
SMEs located in West London and adjacent counties in South-Eastern England in order to highlight the 
problems that such practice raises in terms of data security. Data collection involved a telephone survey 
undertaken in early 2006 of 378 firms classified into four industrial sectors (‘Media’, ‘Logistics’, 
‘Internet Services’ and ‘Food Processing’). After establishing how ICTs and the Internet are being 
exploited as business applications for small firms, data security practice is explored on the basis of 
sector and size with a focus on telework. The paper goes on to highlight areas of concern in terms of 
data security policy and training practice. Findings show some sector and size influences.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
One particular consideration that firms must account for whilst engaged in electronically-mediated 
working is the security of data. Any standard text will argue that a security system can only be as 
strong as its weakest link. In a field that is notoriously difficult to obtain authoritative data, the 
WestFocus research project ‘ICT adoption and use by SMEs’ reported on in this paper attempted to 
gain empirical evidence inter alia on the manner in which SMEs balance security considerations with 
networked working and trading.   
Data security was defined in 1992 by NISS as the “protection of data from unauthorized 
(accidental or intentional) modification, destruction, or disclosure”. McLeod and Schell (1997) 
maintain that data security requires three aspects to be maintained: integrity (i.e. providing an accurate 
representation of the physical reality that data represents); availability (i.e. allowing those authorised to 
have access to data); and confidentiality (i.e the protection of data and information from disclosure to 
unauthorised persons). Without the ability to store, process and transmit data securely, operations may 
be compromised for which there can be very detrimental consequences for trading. Thus the role that 
electronic communications play in business today and its dependency on data security is of critical 
interest. Much of this communication uses open network protocols on an Internet whose underpinning 
technology was originally designed for sharing data in research projects rather than for the purposes of 
e-commerce (Ratnasingham, 1998). Given typical assertions that to retain competitive edge firms must 
develop e-business processes that span more than one organisation (Nah et al., 2004), then firms so 
minded are obliged to exercise some level of oversight for data handling across electronically-enabled 
communications domains that extend beyond the internal. However apart from purely working with 
primary suppliers and customers in electronic alliance, firms are increasingly outsourcing tasks such as 
network support to ‘third parties’ (Gupta and Hammond, 2005) in electronic networks that may 
demand ‘flexible workers’ to have ubiquitous access (i.e. at any place and at any time using fixed 
and/or mobile modes) to both their own information systems and those of trading partners. With 
Spinellis et al. (1999) arguing that advanced technology has in many cases outpaced the development 
of ‘control practice and employee knowledge’, it is clear that the greater use of electronically-enabled 
communications may pose complex challenges for data security.  
While much of the academic literature focuses on large firms, much less is evident on the 
experiences of SMEs in terms of ICT usage (Martin and Matlay, 2001; Dixon et al., 2002) or on the 
emergence of networked trading which proponents such as Straub (2002) argue is becoming the 
dominant commercial paradigm. Clear and objective evidence on how small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) exploit ICTs and the Internet and the concommitant threats to data security need to 
be continually updated if policy makers, small firms and the technology providers that supply them are 
to work with the world as it really is, rather than as it may be portrayed on occasion by some 
technology providers. According to Simpson and Docherty (2004), distrust felt by owner/managers in 
the effectiveness of government-sponsored business support mechanisms conspires to add to a problem 
whereby small firms’ ignorance of new technologies and systems makes them capable of their being 
exploited by technology providers. So in the absence of authoratative and objective voices informing 
small firms of market realities, unchecked commercial imperatives felt by organisations supplying the 
market with ICT-related tools may lead them to overstate threats in order to sell their wares, perhaps 
causing “firms (to) continue to choose technologies which may not be very effective for their 
environment” (Gupta and Hammond, 2005, p. 307). In findings from case studies of eight firms (of 
various sizes), Nathan et al. (2003) note poor ICT procurement practice whereby senior management 
purchase information systems that they do not fully comprehend, to then foist on an untrained staff 
which results in the sub-optimal use of those systems and what they call ‘low-tech equilibrium’. Such a 
backdrop may do little to establish clarity for firms trying to work in a digital realm, and in all 
likelihood may conspire to confuse and hence to compromise data security policy and practice. 
Arguably, this constitutes a market failure. 
There are over 4 million enterprises in the UK (DTI, 2003). The majority of these - nearly 3 
million – are ‘one-man-bands’ (i.e they have no employees) leaving around 1.1 million which have 
employees. Further breakdown shows that 960,000 have between one and nine employees (constituting 
‘micro firms’), 160,600 have between 10 and 49 employees (‘small firms’), 26,000 have between 50 
and 249 employees (‘medium-sized firms’) and just over 6,000 have 250 employees and above (‘large 
firms’). Thus SMEs – firms with between 0 and 249 employees - account for over 99 percent of all 
businesses in the UK, and thus have a significant role to play in the UK economy (Beaver, 2002). For 
the purposes of this study however, firms with no employees (i.e. single operators or ‘one-man-bands’) 
have been excluded. Exploration of sector and size differences will be undertaken therefore on the basis 
of firms with employees only.  
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The paper begins with a review of the literature, followed by an introduction of the WestFocus 
research project and methodology. Next research findings are set out, beginning with data on how ICTs 
and the Internet are being exploited by the SME sample in inter-firm trading. After setting out the 
general e-trading background for the sample as a whole, the discussion moves on to consider ‘offsite 
working’ or ‘telework’ with sector and firm size comparisons, followed by consideration of security 
policy and practice, again based on sector and size data. Then come concluding remarks.               
                                                                                                                            
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a small but growing literature on e-business adoption taking a small firm perspective, 
some of which contains discussion on security risks. One focus whilst looking at adoption is on drivers, 
promoters or advantages of e-business (Poon and Swatman, 1999; Riemenscheider and McKinney, 
2001; Shiels et al., 2003; Simpson and Docherty, 2004; Fillis et al., 2004; Stockdale and Standing, 
2004 & 2006; MacGregor and Vrazalic, 2005) and barriers, hurdles or inhibitors (Riemenscheider and 
McKinney, 2001; Levy and Powell, 2003; Simpson and Docherty, 2004; Fillis et al., 2004; Stockdale 
and Standing, 2004 & 2006; Taylor and Murphy, 2004; MacGregor and Vrazalic, 2005). In a 2002 
literature review of the area Dixon et al. (2002) identify common aspects found in relation to e-
business adoption barriers for SMEs. Concerns for security and privacy is one such in a list that also 
contains a generalised lack of awareness of the potential of ICT, a lack of an IT skills base, concerns 
for high initial set-up costs, and a lack of staff to implement ICT. The general depth of discussion on 
security issues however in this literature is limited as noted in Appendix 1. Thus some authors spend a 
paragraph discussing the subject while others do little more than mention it. So while the subject of 
security is often raised in this literature, it lacks in-depth examination. 
Researchers note the heterogeneity of SMEs (Martin and Matlay, 2001; Dixon et al., 2002; Taylor 
and Murphy, 2004), and sector and size examinations have been made of SME ICT and e-business 
adoption. Results are conflicting in places. Simpson and Docherty (2004) find sector to be a significant 
factor in e-business adoption and Martin and Matlay (2001) add that a micro-business focusing on 
business services is more likely to adopt ICT than a similar-sized manufacturing firm.  Levy and 
Powell (2003) on the other hand find little evidence on the basis of sector for differential patterns in 
ICT adoption. Similarly, Van Beveren and Thompson (2002), MacGregor and Vrazalic (2005) and 
Levenburg (2005), argue that firm size is a significant factor in e-business adoption while Levy and 
Powell (2003) argue, in relation to ICT adoption, that size is not significant.   
Another focus in this literature is on adoption models with a number being critical of stage models 
(which include the ‘DTI Adoption Model’) (Martin and Matlay, 2001; Levy and Powell, 2003; Fillis et 
al., 2004; Taylor and Murphy, 2004) on which UK business support has been based. These authors see 
stage models as prescriptive and ill-fitting of actual small firm adoption behavior. Simpson and 
Docherty (2004) are particularly critical of some business support mechanisms as delivered on the 
ground and based on the stage model paradigm; Levy and Powell (2003) argue for a ‘contingent’ 
approach in which adoption behavior is seen to be based more on apparent business need than on a 
linear and apparently seamless progression towards some vaguely-defined ‘digital nirvana’ where 
pervasive and integrated operations are transacted between and amongst firms. Ill-fitting policy can 
help contribute to distrust of government support agencies by small firms as Simpson and Docherty 
(2004) note with the potential effect of inhibiting small firms from seeking what should be 
‘disinterested’ advice on critical issues such as data security. However MacGregor and Vrazalic (2005) 
find some taxonomies ‘manufactured’ (p. 511) and reflections of research design rather than reality on 
the ground. Citing Watson et al. (2000), Fillis et al. (2004) appear highly critical of the academic 
literature by warning of “the continued belief by many researchers in the sole value of formalised, 
structured, prescriptive ways of conceptualising business behavior despite the realities of non-linear, 
sometimes chaotic behavior” (p.350).  
From an intra-firm ‘distributed working’ or ‘telework’ perspective, there is still however a paucity 
of in-depth academic research that looks into data security per se let alone one taking a small firm 
perspective. Aside from arguments on its efficacy, much writing on telework examines management 
issues raised by telework or, as for e-business, examines barriers inhibiting its adoption. So Lim and 
Teo (2000) in a commentary on ICT use in teleworking spend one paragraph discussing the risk of 
confidential data loss. Authors who take a more distinct focus on data security include Gupta and 
Hammond (2005) who examine IS security issues in small businesses. Echoing Spinellis et al. (1999) 
they go on to highlight resources as an issue for small firms where data security is concerned, and 
observe that 49% of organisations in the U.K see budget constraints as having some prime influence on 
‘computer security implementations’. They detail constraints felt by small firms in relation to security 
as: lack of staff with security expertise; lack of financial resources to hire expert help or to provide 
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training; lack of understanding of risks or being dismissive of them; inability to focus upon security due 
to other business priorities (Gupta and Hammond, 2005).  
Authors directly examining telework and data security issues however are Sturgeon (1996) and 
Spinellis et al. (1999). Sturgeon identifies risks such as individual teleworkers handling sensitive data 
from home; Spinellis et al. who compare home office security threats with those of small firms 
examine the use of networked information systems (IS) within small businesses and home offices. 
They go on to argue that each shares a similar lack of technical expertise and resources by which to 
create and maintain a security posture adequate to apparent threat. Both studies argue for use of risk 
assessment procedures to minimise such threats. Amongst sometimes dated recommendations, Nilles 
(1998) argues for strong methods of user authentication and for network design principles that reflect a 
heterogeneity of access modes. Rikitake et al. (2001, 2002a, 2002b) examine data security issues raised 
by technologies such as WLANs, teleconferencing, P2P and VoIP in telework. They point, for 
example, to the risk of other family members using the same home PC and accessing, perhaps, Peer-to-
Peer (P2P) networks which are known to be risky due to the possibility, they imply, of picking up 
computer viruses and other malware (2001). A US government-sponsored study (Kuhn et al., 2002) on 
telecommuting points to vulnerabilities in, amongst others, wireless networking, web browsers and 
printing software.  
More typical of the literature are telework studies which have distinct foci other than security, but 
which note data security vulnerabilities as part of their examinations. Thus Clear and Dickson (2005) in 
a study on how management attitudes and levels of worker autonomy shape telework adoption in small 
firms discuss risks to data security in terms of its being a major disadvantage to the adoption of 
telework. Fulton et al. (2001) in a study on ‘home-based e-work’ that examines the blurring of home 
and work boundaries identify the shared use of home PCs as being a source of risk for data security.  
Tremblay (2002) explores work-life balance issues, but points to the dissatisfaction expressed by 
teleworkers of cumbersome security procedures.  An Australian study (Standen and Sinclair-Jones, 
2003) notes security issues raised by outsourcing and the development of a globalised service sector 
workforce. They go on to promote the use of ‘ethical hackers’ who can be employed to test network 
defences. Illegems and Verbeke (2003) argue that one of the factors militating against telework 
adoption is that it ‘hinders the security of internal data’ (p. 79) with two possible forms of unauthorised 
access defined: industrial espionage and intrusion by employees. They also argue that any form of 
telework implementation that leads to employees becoming self-employed freelancers will raise the 
level of risk to internal data as loyalty to their firm will diminish. Tran and Atkinson (2002) argue that 
privacy and security processes are required for multinational firms transferring data across international 
borders. Given the complexities of the issues inherent in the protection of data security, Lohmeyer et 
al. (2002) argue that IT departments should employ managed security providers (MSPs) to help them 
face security challenges online. 
There are a number of guides offering advice on ‘good practice’ in relation to data security when 
working in a distributed and electronically-mediated manner and three are noted here.  Huws and Podro 
(1995) argue that teleworkers should be trained to protect data security through anti-virus software, 
password use and taking back-ups of work-in-progress; if such training were not forthcoming, then 
teleworkers should not be held responsible for losses of data.  The ‘UK Online for Business’ 
publication ‘Working Anywhere’ (2000) points out that safe data handling is dependant not just on 
technical measures and procedures but also on having reliable and vetted staff.  Kuhn et al. (2002) 
argue that telecommuting staff working for US federal bodies should be given guidance on selecting 
appropriate technology, software packages and tools in order for best practice in data security to be 
followed.  
However most of these authors are not reporting on small firms per se, and thus there is a hole in 
the literature given small businesses are not simply ‘scaled-down versions’ of large businesses (Quayle, 
2004; MacGregor and Vrazalic, 2005). Numerous writers note that small firms face resource 
constraints not necessarily faced by large firms (Poon and Swatman, 1999; Levy and Powell, 2003; 
Simpson and Docherty, 2004; Fillis et al., 2004; Gupta and Hammond, 2005. Smith and Rupp (2002) 
(cited in Gupta and Hammond, 2005) note that that smaller organisations may place a more limited 
value on information and its security than larger ones. So though Walden (2005) echoes assertions by 
Schneier (2000, 2003) that data security issues are not properly understood or given adequate attention 
in many organisations – i.e. irrespective of size - for theory on SMEs to be relevant, consideration of 
their “motivations, constraints and uncertainties” (p. 18) must be made which are different in 
comparison to their larger cousins (Westhead aand Storey, 1996).  
Questions of data security are raised amongst other aspects by differing modes of access (fixed 
versus wireless) and in terms of the variegation of devices (including PCs, personal digital assistants 
(PDAs) and mobile phones/cell phones) with writers such as Ghosh and Swaminatha (2001) arguing 
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that mobile commerce raises new security and privacy risks. Nevertheless, whatever the technologies 
and use of protocols that may protect data security whilst in transit across electronic networks, Gordon 
(2004) tempers any technology obsession by arguing that “If employees can walk out of the door of 
those organizations with reports, drawings, diskettes, files, and anything else in their pockets or 
briefcases (as they almost always can), then it’s incorrect to say that telecommuting presents a new and 
different risk”. Apart from deliberate intent by individuals to compromise the security of data, 
Lundegaard argues that “Disruptions of information systems are mostly a result of human error, 
ranging from system integration mistakes to accidental cutting of fibre optic cables, and natural 
disasters...” (Lundegaard, 1997). Whatever the source of risk, Reuvid (2004) argues that management 
controls and processes overseeing security are critical factors for firm survival. Thus Higgins (1999) 
observes, “a policy is the start of security management” (p. 217) and that “Effective security 
management … is based on the systematic concept, dissemination and operation of an information 
security policy”. In the absence of such a policy, businesses may be seen as vulnerable, whether as the 
result of accident or malevolence. So a firm having a policy suggests that at least some appraisal has 
been made of potential security threats, however imperfect.   
In sum, there are a limited number of studies taking a small firm perspective that focus on security 
issues raised by electronically-mediated working. As a whole the SME literature offers a sketchy view 
of security risks faced by small firms in a virtual domain. Amongst a growing volume of studies 
looking at ICT and e-Business adoption that account for SME experience, a number focus on the 
‘drivers’ and ‘barriers’ to adoption and/or adoption models, sometimes with sector and firm size 
consideration. Often security is noted in taxonomies of barriers, but the depth of analysis is such that in 
many parts the subject appears more mentioned than discussed. A strong critique is made of stage 
models and in particular the ICT adoption model used by the DTI to underpin UK business support 
policy. Discussion on the impact of such policy on data security issues however is not very apparent in 
this literature. A number of writers argue for small firms to start to use risk management methods by 
which to face up to e-Business security challenges. Nevertheless a persistent reminder in this literature 
is that a small firm perspective requires consideration of resource constraints. So the literature 
individuating telework that examines data security is limited  Thus other studies, some taking a small 
firm perspective and some not, need to be sought out for relevant analysis on data security issues within 
virtual domains.  
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
The research findings discussed in this paper are derived from a telephone survey of 378 firms 
located in a region bounded by West London boroughs and adjacent counties. This involved use of a 
structured questionnaire of 51 questions which collected data on a broad range of company activities 
related to ICT adoption and use, including ICT strategy, implementation, investment, training and 
security policy. As part of a collaborative effort by researchers from Royal Holloway, Kingston and 
Brunel universities, the target for this phase of a WestFocus project examining ‘ICT adoption and use 
by SMEs’ was for 400 completed interviews on the basis of 100 firms each from four industry sectors. 
These sectors are ‘Media’, ‘Logistics’, ‘Internet Services’, and ‘Food Processing’, all seen as making 
significant economic contributions to the study region. Listings of firms for the sectors were obtained 
from a commercial database provider, and these were sampled until the survey team obtained 100 
interviews per sector. The telephone survey took between 20 to 30 minutes to complete, and was 
undertaken between January and March 2006. Upon completion of the survey, detailed examination of 
the data by the analysis team led to a certain number of interviews being removed to create a final 
sample of 378 interviews.  
Univariate analysis using SPSS was undertaken of the WestFocus dataset by use of frequency 
distributions for the whole dataset and by use of cross-tabulations of data by sector and size and other 
variables. The Chi-square test is applied to these cross-tabulations, and the significance measure is 
displayed in footnotes. If the Chi-square test shows a lack of significance, then such data is ignored.   
According to an European Commission (2002) definition, a Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
(SME) has between zero and 249 employees, has a turnover of less than 50 million Euros, and is no 
more than 25% owned by a non-SME (not including banks or venture capitalists). Due to difficulties in 
establishing ownership patterns, and getting accurate turnover data, one limitation of the empirical 
work in this paper is that data has been gathered on firms on the basis of employee numbers only.   
As can be seen in Table 1 which shows breakdown of the survey sample by size and sector, the 
sample is composed of 100 firms from the ‘Logistics’ and ‘Food Processing’ sectors, 90 firms from the 
‘Media’ sector, and 88 firms from the ‘Internet Services’ sector, making 378 firms in the dataset as a 
whole. By size the sample is composed of 205 ‘micro firms’ (1-9 employees), 140 ‘small firms’ (10-49 
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employees) and 33 ‘medium-sized firms’ (50-249 employees). The comparatively low number of 
medium-sized firms in the WestFocus sample overall and the relatively low number of ‘Media’ (3) and 
‘Internet Services’ (5) firms in this size category act as research limitations. Apart from other 
considerations, any cell with frequency data lower than five invalidates the Chi-square significance 
test. Any data in cross-tabular analysis that fails this test is ignored. Thus findings shown in this paper 
are sometimes constrained to present only partial representations of size and sector data.        
 
 
Table 1: Survey Sample Breakdown by Size and Sector 
Firm Size  
Micro Small Medium Total 
Media 60 27 3 90 
Logistics 49 38 13 100 
Internet Services 49 34 5 88 
 
 
Sector 
Food Processing 47 41 12 100 
 Total 205 140 33 378 
 
4 FINDINGS 
The data examined in this section show various findings from the survey. Some of the data is 
shown on the basis of the whole sample, while other data is shown with breakdown by sector and size. 
The first findings examined are related to technology use, and this is followed by an examination of 
‘offsite working’ and security policy and practice.   
 
 
Table 2: Technology Use for Whole Sample 
Technology % 
Email 99% 
Internet 99% 
Anti-virus software 96% 
Firewall 93% 
Own computer network (LAN/WAN) 86% 
Broadband 84% 
Company Website 84% 
Wireless access 53% 
Intranet 40% 
Extranet/EDI 31% 
Video/audio-conferencing 27% 
Groupware 23% 
 
 
Table 2 shows frequency data for a series of technologies and their use by the whole sample. 
Email (99%) and Internet (99%) use are practically ubiquitous, followed closely by anti-virus software 
(96%) and firewalls (93%). Own computer network (86%), use of broadband (84%) and company 
websites (also 84%) also have relatively high levels of adoption. Wireless access is used by 53% of 
firms, a notable level of adoption given the amount of time that such access has become available. 40% 
of the sample use intranets and 31% use extranet/EDI technology. Video/audio-conferencing (27%) 
and Groupware (23%) are the least pervasive technologies in the list.  
Levels of use of anti-virus software and firewalls almost mirror email and Internet ubiquity, and 
taken together suggest that firms are aware of Internet-borne threats and thus take measures to protect 
themselves. While each of these firms can demonstrate apparent intention, whether their infrastructures 
are actually secure (to some nominal 99.9% level) is not clear. So a limitation of the data is that 
evidence that might contradict this picture such as whether firewalls are mis-configured and the level of 
currency of anti-virus software (i.e. how up-to-date it is) was not obtained as part of the survey. 
Additionally this data is obviously based at the level of the firm and does not account for practice by 
individual employees. That said, other technologies of note in terms of distributed working are 
video/audioconferencing – used by 27% of the sample – and groupware – used by 23%.  
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Table 3 shows frequency of response to the question, “Do you use the Internet to…?” (and 
individual options shown in the table) for the sample as a whole. According to these figures it is 
arguable that ‘networked trading’ is an established phenomenon in supply chains with customer-facing 
(downstream) use being more prevalent than supplier-facing (upstream) use. Figures for trading are 
58% and 50% respectively in terms of customers and suppliers. A surprising finding is the relatively 
high level of the use of the Internet to make payments, with 61% of firms receiving payment from 
customers and 56% of firms making payment to suppliers. Notably 44% of firms use the Internet to 
work with other firms on collaborative ventures.  
 
   
Table 3: Use of Internet for Trading Purposes 
Trading Purpose % 
Receive payments from customers 61% 
Trade with customers 58% 
Make payments to suppliers 56% 
Trade with suppliers 50% 
Work with other firms on collaborative ventures 44% 
 
 
As numerous commentators including Ratnasingham (1998) argue, trust is a vital element in the 
take-up of electronically-mediated trading. Allowing access by trading partners to a firm’s systems 
requires, arguably, a high level of trust on the part of the ‘provider’ to the ‘user’ (Straub, 2002). Table 4 
shows frequency of response to the question “Do you allow remote access to your systems / databases 
by customers / suppliers / joint venture partners?”. Only 11% of the sample allow customers remote 
access with 6% allowing such access by suppliers and 5% doing so by joint venture partners. The 
figures are too low for meaningful statistical examination by size or sector.  Thus the overwhelming 
majority of firms in the survey sample do not allow trading partners, whether customers, suppliers or 
joint venture partners, to have remote access to their systems. While these findings do not in 
themselves shed light on the issue of trust and any inherent data security risks whilst working in an 
electronic realm, or, for that matter, on the availability or otherwise of appropriate and cost-effective 
technology, this data does suggest that close electronic working across supply chains is still rare 
amongst SMEs.  
 
 
Table 4: Remote Access to a firm’s systems / databases by trading partner 
Trading partner  % 
Customers 11% 
Suppliers 6% 
Joint venture partners 5% 
 
 
Attention now shifts to challenges faced by firms undertaking electronically-mediated trading. 
Table 5 shows frequency of response for the whole sample to the question “Have you experienced any 
of the following challenges in developing e-commerce for your business?” As surveyed firms could 
respond to more than one of the options offered, the data is not mutually exclusive.  Of greatest 
relevance to the concept of ‘distributed trading/working’ are the responses ‘Customers do not want to 
change’ (19%), ‘Suppliers are not ready for electronic business’ (10%) and ‘Difficulties with 
information sharing in collaborative ventures’ (8%). For those promoting the greater use of 
electronically-mediated trading, such data must offer succour given the relatively low response rate for 
these challenges as a whole. From the data security perspective, the responses ‘Security failures / 
problems’ (6%) and ‘Internet fraud’ (8%) are most relevant. Though not identical in description, this 
latter finding chimes with the “Theft or fraud involving computers” finding from the DTI security 
breaches survey of 8% (DTI, 2006). Again such findings will offer succour to promoters of 
electronically-mediated trading. However, getting reliable statistics on security issues is difficult 
(Smith et al. 2002 cited in Walden, 2005), therefore figures on the subject should always be 
approached with caution. 
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Table 5: E-commerce challenges 
E-commerce challenge % 
Customers do not want to change 19% 
Difficulty in getting good technical advice from outside 15% 
High costs to develop / maintain the web site 14% 
Difficulty in hiring staff with appropriate IT skills 13% 
Suppliers are not ready for electronic business 10% 
High connection costs 8% 
Difficulties with information sharing in collaborative ventures 8% 
Internet fraud 8% 
Security failures / problems 6% 
 
 
Moving on to a sectoral examination of technology use, data failing the Chi-square 0.05% 
significance test was removed from consideration. Thus Internet, email, firewall and anti-virus software 
– all of near-ubiquitous use – are ignored for further analysis. Technologies explored in Table 6 
therefore are ‘Broadband’ (84% adoption rate for the whole sample), ‘Wireless Access’ (53%) 
‘Intranet’ (40%), ‘Extranet/EDI’ (31%) and ‘Video/Audio-conferencing’ (27%). Within the 84% 
overall adoption rate for Broadband, there is a high of 94% for ‘Media’ and a low of 81% for ‘Food 
Processing’. This is the only case in which ‘Internet Services’ (84%) is not the lead adopting sector. So 
while 81% of the ‘Internet Services’ sample has wireless access, a notably high figure, the other three 
sectors show rates of 50% and less. This pattern of adoption is repeated for the three remaining 
technologies with ‘Internet Services’ firms running ahead of ‘Media’, ‘Logistics’ and ‘Food 
Processing’ at adoption rates that are significantly greater. So while 68% of the ‘Internet Services’ 
sample uses an intranet, the other three sectors’ figures are 38% and less; while 50% of ‘Internet 
Services’ uses ‘Extranet/EDI’, the other three sectors’ figures are 34% and less; and while 56% of 
‘Internet Services’ uses ‘Video/Audio-conferencing’, the other three sectors’ figures are 32% and less. 
Though the figures for the other three sectors are much more bunched, ‘Logistics’ is shown to be the 
least-adopting sector for four out of the five technologies. ‘Media’ appears to slightly lead ‘Food 
Processing’ in overall adoption rates for the five technologies which are not much greater than 
‘Logistics’. 
While the data shown here does not show relative use of the technologies by firms in the sample, 
nevertheless they suggest that electronically-mediated working is practised to relatively high levels by 
the sample as a whole, and particularly by ‘Internet Services’. Even if it may come as no surprise that 
this sector leads the pack given the nature of their business, it is still sobering to recall that the Internet 
as a business tool emerged little over 10 years ago.  
 
 
Table 6: Technology Subset Use by Sector 
Technology  Media Logistics Internet 
Services 
Food 
Processing 
Broadband 94%1 78% 84% 81% 
Wireless access 48% 35% 81% 50% 
Intranet 38% 36% 68% 28% 
Extranet/EDI 21% 20% 50% 34% 
Video/Audio conferencing 32% 14% 56% 16% 
 
 
Having established some ICT adoption and use patterns for the sample as a whole and by sector, 
attention is now drawn to the firms’ use of ‘offsite working’ and security policy and practice. While 
there are other measures that can be used to evaluate apparent preparedness in data security terms (e.g. 
policy noted in a staff handbook or employee contract or as part of an induction process), due to the 
necessity for economy in the survey, two questions were put that were adjudged to be more revealing in 
these terms. These are “Does your company have a written security policy for employee use of IT?” 
(referred to in Table 7 as ‘Written security policy’) and “Do your employees get training to make them 
aware of IT security issues?” (referred to in Table 7 as ‘Security Training’). The other question “Do 
any of your company’s personnel work offsite with access to your information systems (or 
                                                          
1 Missing data for 1 firm 
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‘telework’)?” is referred to in Table 7 as ‘Offsite working’. This latter question was so framed in order 
to avoid possible confusion over sole use of the term ‘telework’ which the author had experienced in 
previous research on the subject (Dickson and Clear, 2003). Arguably working offsite ‘….with access 
to your information systems’ is a reasonable synonym for ‘telework’ in any event. For the sample as a 
whole, 51% responded in the affirmative to the question on ‘Offsite working’. However when cross-
tabulating with ‘sector’, for three of the four (‘Media’, ‘Logistics’ and ‘Food Processing’) the 
proportion of firms denying having ‘offsite working’ in these terms was greater than those having it, 
with responses of 45%, 37% and 43% respectively. Only ‘Internet Services’ had a greater proportion of 
‘offsite working’ (82%) than not.  
 
 
Table 7: ‘Offsite working’, ‘Written security policy’ and ‘Security training’ by Sector 
 Sector 
 Media Logistics Internet 
Services 
Food 
Processing 
'Offsite working'2 45% 37% 82% 43% 
Written security policy3 30% 32% 53% 45% 
Security training4 46% 40% 79% 51% 
 
 
In terms of security policy, as noted above, if management controls and processes are important 
for a firm’s survival (Reuvid, 2004), then to manage data security some form of policy will be required 
(Higgins, 1999). Policies can be formal or informal, but in order to gather definitive data on the issue, a 
focus was placed on whether firms had a written and therefore formal security policy or not. With 40% 
of the whole sample answering ‘yes’ to this question, breakdown by sector shows that only ‘Internet 
Services’ (53%) had a greater proportion of those with a written security policy than not. This suggests 
that ‘Internet Services’ firms are generally more aware of the need for data security than the other 
sectors though ‘Food Processing’ (45%) is not far behind. However, that said, it may be surprising 
given the nature of their business that the proportion of ‘Internet Services’ firms having a formal policy 
is not even higher.     
If having a written security policy demonstrates management commitment to data security in 
theoretical terms, then devoting time and effort to awareness training of staff on IT security issues may 
be seen as putting theory into practice to some extent. Across the whole sample, 53% answered ‘yes’ to 
the question on security training. ‘Internet Services’ and ‘Food Processing’ have a greater proportion 
providing such training than not, with the converse true for ‘Media’ and ‘Logistics’. ‘Internet Services’ 
(79%) firms provide much more training than ‘Food Processing’ (51%), ‘Media’ (46%) and ‘Logistics’ 
(40%). All sectors show greater levels of ‘security training’ than ‘Written security policy’ use. 
However sector heterogeneity is shown elsewhere: figures for ‘offsite working’ are greater than 
‘written security policy’ for ‘Internet Services’, ‘Media’ and ‘Logistics’ while for ‘Food Processing’ 
the opposite is true; figures for ‘offsite working’ and ‘security training’ are similar (+/- 1% and 3%) for 
the same three sectors with the least similar being for ‘Food Processing’ (where ‘security training’ 
exceeds ‘offsite working’ by 8%). So arguably the ‘Food Processing’ sector shows some different 
adoption behavior here from the other three.  
 
Table 8: ‘Offsite Working’, ‘Written security policy’ and ‘Security training’ by Firm Size 
 Size 
 Micro Small Medium 
'Offsite working'5 42% 57% 84% 
Written security policy6 26% 53% 74% 
Security training7 46% 60% 64% 
 
Table 8 shows cross-tabulations between frequency of response to the same three questions as 
noted above for Table 7 but on the basis of firm size. As noted, the overall number of ‘medium-sized 
                                                          
2 Missing: 11 (‘Media’: 2; ‘Logistics’: 1; ‘Internet Services’: 4; ‘Food Processing’: 4); Chi-square significance: .000 
3 Missing: 6  (‘Media’: 1; ‘Logistics’: 1; ‘Internet Services’: 2; ‘Food Processing’: 2); Chi-square significance: .004 
4 Missing: 7  (‘Media’: 1; ‘Internet Services’: 4; ‘Food Processing’: 2); Chi-square significance: .000 
5 Missing: 11 (Micro: 5; Small: 4; Medium: 2); Chi-square significance: .000 
6 Missing: 6  (Micro: 5; Small: 1); Chi-square significance: .000 
7 Missing: 7  (Micro: 5; Small: 2); Chi-square significance: .016 
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firms’ in the whole sample (33) is much smaller than ‘small firms’ (140) and ‘micro firms’ (205). If we 
can accept this as a limitation, then there is an evident size effect in the data for the three questions.  
Responses to the question on ‘offsite working’ show affirmative figures of 42% for ‘micro firms’, 57% 
for ‘small firms’ and 84% for ‘medium-sized firms’. Responses to the question on ‘written security 
policy’ show that 26% of ‘micro firms’, 53% of ‘small firms’ and 74% of ‘medium firms’ have written 
security policies.  This finding chimes with DTI (2006) findings (commented on below) which found 
that “larger companies remain more likely to have a security policy” (p. 7) with 60% of UK businesses 
having no formal security policy (Walden, 2005). The final question on ‘security training’ shows that 
more ‘small firms’ and ‘medium-sized firms’ offer such training than not, with ‘micro firms’ showing 
the converse: 64% of ‘medium-sized firms’ and 60% of ‘small firms’ offer this training while only 46% 
of ‘micro firms’ do so. A ‘switchover’ is evident in this size data: higher rates of training is recorded 
than use of a formal security policy for ‘micro’ and ‘small’ firms but this is in the reverse for ‘medium’ 
firms.  
 
 
Table 9: Training for Awareness of IT Security Issues v ‘Offsite Working’ 
‘Offsite Working’?  
Yes No Total 
Yes 32% 21% 53% 
No 19% 28% 47% 
 
 
Training for 
awareness of IT 
security issues?8 Total 51% 49% 100% 
 
 
At this point, consideration is turned to direct comparison between levels of training on IT security 
awareness and ‘offsite working’ (or ‘telework’) on the basis of the whole sample. Table 9 shows a 
cross-tabulation of frequency of response to the questions “Do any of your company’s personnel work 
offsite with access to your information systems (or ‘telework’)?” and “Do your employees get training 
to make them aware of IT security issues?”. Proportions shown are noted for a total sample of 364 
responses9. The table shows that 51% of the total sample have ‘offsite working’ and 49% not with 53% 
of the total sample having training on IT security awareness and 47% not. Cross-tabulating these two 
variables shows that 32% of the sample have both ‘offsite working’ and training on IT security 
awareness while 19% have ‘offsite working’ and no security training. Put another way, 37% of the 
firms with ‘offsite working’ do not have security training.  
 
 
Table 10: Written Security Policy v ‘Offsite Working’ 
‘Offsite Working’?  
Yes No Total 
Yes 28% 12% 40% 
No 23% 36% 60% 
 
 
Written Security 
Policy?10 
Total 51% 49% 100% 
 
 
Table 10 shows a cross-tabulation of frequency of response to the questions “Do any of your 
company’s personnel work offsite with access to your information systems (or ‘telework’)?” and “Does 
your firm have a written security policy for employee IT use?”  28% of the responses show firms with 
both ‘offsite working’ and a written security policy, but 23% of those firms having ‘offsite working’ do 
not have a written security policy. Put another way, 45% of the firms that have ‘offsite working’ have 
no formal security policy.   
                                                          
8 Missing: 12; Chi-square significance: .000 
9 On a methodological note, from this point findings for total numbers of responses may differ with those cited in sections 
above. So whereas the number of those having ‘offsite working’ noted above is 367 (with missing data for 11 firms), and the 
equivalent number for ‘training for awareness of IT security issues’ is 371 (with missing data for 7 firms), the confluence of data 
for these two responses produces a total of 364. If data is missing for either question, then that case will be ignored for analysis 
purposes. Variability of totals for the same question between different cross-tabulations is explained by the fact that missing data 
can be mutually exclusive (i.e. where data is missing for one question only) or mutually inclusive (i.e. where data is missing for 
both questions).  
10 Missing: 13; Chi-square significance: .000 
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Now cross-tabulation of the data is attempted using three variables. However a lack of statistical 
significance reported by SPSS for the Chi-square test renders some cross-tabulations invalid. Cross-
tabulating the training variable with formal policy and ‘offsite working’ variables is one such enquiry, 
so is ignored from further consideration.  Therefore attention is drawn to use of a formal security policy 
and ‘offsite working’ by size and sector, though here too there are limitations. Failure of the Chi-square 
significance test is also the case for ‘medium’ firms so cross-tabulation of  ‘written security policy’ and 
‘offsite working’ data (as shown in Table 10) by firm is restricted to ‘micro’ (Table 11) and ‘small’ 
(Table 12) views. Table 11 shows that 42% of the total of 196 micro firms have ‘offsite working’ with 
14% having a written security policy and 28% not. Table 12 shows that 57% of small firms have 
‘offsite working’ with 39% having a written security policy and 18% not. This shows an apparent size 
effect: the smaller the firm the less likely they are to have ‘offsite working’ or a written security policy.  
 
Table 11: Written Security Policy v ‘Offsite Working’ v Firm Size: Micro Firms 
Offsite Working’? 
 Yes No Total 
Yes 14% 12% 26% 
No 28% 46% 74% 
 
 
Written Security 
Policy?11 
Total 42% 58% 100% 
 
 
Table 12: Written Security Policy v ‘Offsite Working’ v Firm Size: Small Firms 
Offsite Working’? 
 Yes No Total 
Yes 39% 13% 52% 
No 18% 29% 48% 
 
 
Written Security 
Policy?12 
Total 57% 43% 100% 
 
 
To view sector influences, ‘written security policy’ and ‘offsite working’ data in Table 10 is 
further cross-tabulated by sector and results are shown in Tables 13 & 14. However data for the 
‘Internet Services’ and ‘Media’ sectors failed the Ch-square test so only data for ‘Logistics’ and ‘Food 
Processing’ is shown. Table 13 shows that 38% of ‘Logistics’ firms have ‘offsite working’ with 21% 
having a ‘written security policy’ and 17% not. Table 14 shows that 42% of ‘Food Processing’ firms 
have ‘offsite working’ with 27% having a written security policy and 17% not.  So while ‘Food 
Processing’ shows significantly more firms having ‘offsite working’ than ‘Logistics’, this is not the 
case for use of a ‘written security policy’ where ‘Logistics’ has a slightly higher rate of adoption than 
‘Food Processing’.  
 
 
Table 13: Written Security Policy v ‘Offsite Working’ v Sector: Logistics 
Offsite Working’? 
 Yes No Total 
Yes 21% 12% 33% 
No 17% 50% 67% 
 
 
Written Security 
Policy?13 
Total 38% 62% 100% 
 
Table 14: Written Security Policy v ‘Offsite Working’ v Sector: Food Processing 
Offsite Working’? 
 Yes No Total 
Yes 27% 17% 45% 
No 15% 40% 55% 
 
 
Written Security 
Policy?14 
Total 42% 58% 100% 
                                                          
11 Missing: 9; Chi-square significance: .041  
12 Missing: 4; Chi-square significance: .000 
13 Missing: 2; Chi-square significance: .000 
14 Missing: 6; Chi-square significance: .001  
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5 DISCUSSION 
To give some perspective to data in the whole WestFocus sample, some analysis from the bi-
annual DTI Information Security Breaches Surveys of 2004 and 2006 is included in Table 15 which 
shows the level of threat faced by firms working in an electronic realm. The DTI data is based on a 
sample of 1,001 firms of all firm sizes (i.e. including large firms) so comparison with WestFocus SME 
data cannot be wholly valid. Nevertheless, given the paucity of empirical data on security risks faced 
by small firms, the DTI data acts as a benchmark here. The evidence from these surveys highlight a 
relatively variegated picture of some of the threats to data security: ‘virus infection and disruptive 
software’ and ‘theft and fraud involving computers’ have decreased in incidence after a hiatus in 2004; 
‘staff misuse of information systems’, and ‘unauthorized access by outsiders (including hacking 
attempts)’ increased from 2002 to 2004 but have more-or-less plateaued after this; and ‘systems failure 
or data corruption’ have increased in incidence (given there is  missing data for 2002).  
 
 
Table 15: Type of Security breach suffered by UK businesses in 2002, 2004 & 2006 Surveys 
Type of Breach 2002 2004 2006 
Virus infection and disruptive software 41% 50% 35% 
Staff misuse of information systems 11% 22% 21% 
Unauthorised access by outsiders (including 
hacking attempts) 
14% 17% 17% 
Theft or fraud involving computers 6% 11% 8% 
Systems failure or data corruption N/A 27% 29% 
Source: Compilation from DTI Information Security Breaches Surveys 2004  and 2006  
 
 
The DTI typology does not yield exact equivalents for WestFocus data, but two comparisons are 
made here as a means of exploring the data. A WestFocus rate of 8% for ‘Internet fraud’ is exactly the 
same as the 2006 DTI figure for ‘Theft or fraud involving computers’. However ‘Security failures / 
problems’ at 6% in WestFocus data is significantly different from the 2006 DTI figure for the nearest 
equivalent term ‘Systems failure or data corruption’ of 29%. Whatever the quality of these 
comparisons, and with caution extended to the value of self-revealed data on sensitive issues such as 
data security, the WestFocus figures do not make a case for overbearing levels of risk faced by small 
firms trading online. Certainly the high levels of electronically-mediated trading evident in the 
WestFocus data - which chime with general  year-on-year volume growth in electronically-mediated 
trading as a whole (Fulford and Doherty, 2003) – can be set favourably against the relatively low 
figures for security incidents.  
Further comparison between the two sets of data can be made in terms of ‘security policy’ and 
‘security training’. A figure of 40% is shared by WestFocus ‘written security policy’ data and the DTI 
‘formally defined and documented information security policy’ data (2006). However, given that the 
‘large firms’ component for the DTI finding is noted as 73%, the true figure for SME security policy in 
the DTI data must be lower than 40%. In terms of training WestFocus data shows a figure of 53% for 
the ‘training for awareness of IT security issues’ while DTI figures show that 35% of the sample 
overall undertake ‘training and presentations’ as one means by which firms ‘make their staff aware of 
their obligations regarding security issues’ (DTI, 2006). Further, a DTI figure of 40% for large firms 
implies that the figure for SMEs in the DTI sample must be lower than 35%. Accepting the inherent 
limitations of both of these comparisons, this analysis again reflects favourably on the WestFocus 
sample.          
From a technological perspective, the use of Internet-related technologies found in this study 
shows that a basic electronic communications infrastructure (composed of Internet, email, firewalls and 
anti-virus software) is in place for the WestFocus sample as a whole. While the almost ubiquitous use 
of these technologies makes sector and firm size considerations irrelevant, sector influence is evident 
for a subset of other technologies examined (‘wireless access’, ‘intranet’, ‘extranet/EDI’ and 
’video/audio conferencing’) which have lower general levels of take up in comparison with the ‘basic 
infrastructure’ technologies. Greatest adoption rates – by some margin – are for ‘Internet Services’, 
with a notable high of 81% for ‘wireless access’.  ‘Broadband’ bucks the adoption-by-sector trend in 
that ‘Media’ firms are its greatest adopters, but this can be tempered by the very high levels of its 
adoption overall. At the level of the whole sample, the relatively high levels of Internet use for 
commercial purposes (such as receiving payment from customers) suggest that ‘networked trading’ 
may be entrenched in places. If sector adoption behavior established for ICT holds true for commercial 
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uses, then assertions made by Nah et al. (2004) - that firms need to develop e-business processes 
spanning more than one organisation in order to maintain a competitive edge – would appear most 
keenly matched, unsurprisingly perhaps, by the ‘Internet Services’ sector. Some way behind in terms of 
technology adoption come ‘Media’ and ‘Food Processing’, with ‘Logistics’ as the slight laggard. The 
WestFocus data does not identify high relative levels of e-commerce challenges for firms in the sample 
as a whole. To what extent use of a such an infrastructure guarantees secure distributed working and 
electronically-mediated trading for firms is by definition difficult to measure, even if some general 
perspective on security threat has been garnered. Nevertheless the comparatively low levels of remote 
access accorded by the whole sample to trading partners suggests that the majority of SMEs are not 
ready for and/or do not have the high levels of trust necessary for the kind of integrated trading along 
their supply chains propounded by writers such as Straub (2002). Certainly DTI figures add a 
threatening backdrop in that firms that allow remote access are twice as likely to have their networks 
penetrated (2006).   
 Mirroring work on e-commerce adoption (Martin and Matlay, 2001; Simpson and Docherty, 
2004), evidence was found for differences in ‘offsite working’ (i.e. teleworking) on the basis of sector, 
and for data security practices on the basis of both sector and size. In terms of sector, ‘Internet 
Services’ demonstrated greatest attention to data security risks in terms of written security policies and 
provision of training for IT security awareness. As with levels of technology adoption, overall the other 
sectors (‘Food Processing’, ‘Media’ and ‘Logistics’) come some way behind in these terms. A common 
adoption pattern for these three sectors shows that ‘security training’ levels were slightly greater than 
‘offsite working’ with ‘written security policy’ trailing somewhat. ‘Internet Services’ had a slightly 
higher level of ‘offsite working’ than ‘security training’ to buck the trend, but the much higher levels of 
technology adoption and use of ‘offsite working’, ‘written security policy’ and ‘security training’ mark 
the sector out as different to the rest. Nevertheless in all four sectors, use of a formal security policy 
came in third place. However additional sector level data for ‘Logistics’ and ‘Food Processing’ points 
to further differences in behavior with ‘Food Processing’ firms enjoying higher levels of ‘offsite 
working’ though lower levels of formal security policy. Suggestions that ‘Food Processing’ firms are 
more promiscuous than ‘Logistics’ firms in security terms should be tempered however with evidence 
that ‘Food Processing’ as a sector has more awareness training on security issues for employees than 
‘Logistics’.  
In regard to size, generally the larger the firm, the greater the levels of written security policies 
and training in evidence, which chimes with work on e-commerce adoption (MacGregor and Vrazalic, 
2005; Levenburg, 2005; Van Beveren and Thompson, 2002). In the WestFocus data, different behavior 
is apparent between ‘written security policy’ and ‘security training’ by firm size. So while response 
rates for ‘micro’ and ‘small’ firms show higher response rates for security training than formal security 
policy, the converse is true for ‘medium’ firms where response rates for formal security policy exceed 
those for security training. In the absence of additional analysis using the training variable, direct 
comparison between ‘offsite working’ and ‘written security policy’ for ‘micro’ and ‘small’ firms shows 
higher proportionate use of policy by ‘small’ firms than ‘micro’ firms.   
     There is a trade-off between the apparent robustness of measures taken to protect data security 
and the ability to trade or work with information systems. Obviously a security interface that is overly 
robust can stymie attempts to work remotely. As Nilles (1998) argues, tongue-in-cheek, “sensitive 
company information is easiest to protect from outside intruders if it is kept securely locked in the 
company’s vaulted, main office computers with no access allowed from the outside” (p. 83). In a 
networked electronic world of course such a stance would be untenable, with telework by definition 
impossible. The ability to telework at its simplest functional level requires a PC, a telephone line, an 
ISP (internet service provider) account and an email agent. Then, where electronic communication is 
restricted to email use only between remote worker and colleagues at a central location, arguably the 
level of controls required to handle data safely would be relatively minimal, all things considered; 
similarly the ability to interrupt workflow when systems are offline may be relatively minimal. If on 
the other hand such ‘offsite working’ required direct access to a firm’s systems by a mobile worker 
exploiting wireless technology, then additional controls may be required to provide a similar level of 
apparent data security. Such additional controls may bring in their train some greater potential to 
interrupt workflow. Thus drawing the balance between the robustness of a firm’s security system and 
an ability to work or trade whilst offsite requires management consideration.  
 In a dynamic and fast-moving marketplace, wireless communications, for example, is noted as 
one technology posing threats to secure teleworking (Rikitake, 2002a). Adoption of ‘wireless access’ 
does not by definition imply ‘remote’ or ‘offsite access’ necessarily as wireless technologies such as 
Bluetooth are designed for short-distance transmissions amongst local devices and a teleworker is 
notionally some ‘non-local’ distance away from co-workers. Nevertheless it is possible to conjecture 
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scenarios in which teleworkers in the sample firms access systems remotely using wireless means. If 
critical and sensitive data were to be handled in these scenarios, then the 2006 DTI survey (whose 
limitations as a comparator for this study are noted above) might raise questions in data security terms 
when it observes that 60% of firms that allow remote access, and 40% of firms that allow staff to 
connect via public wireless (WiFi) hotspots), do not encrypt their transmissions. While technological 
solutions should be seen only as part of meeting challenges to data security, encryption, where desired, 
implies more complex data handling processes and working practices for firms, and hence higher costs. 
Given observations on resource constraints faced by small firms (Poon and Swatman, 1999;  Levy and 
Powell, 2003; Simpson and Docherty, 2004; Fillis et al., 2004; Gupta and Hammond, 2005) the ability 
for firms to accommodate users whether ‘onsite’ or ‘offsite’ using fixed and mobile (wireless) modes 
and perhaps via a multiplicity of devices (e.g. PC, mobile phone) in an apparently secure extended 
electronic network may be beyond the level of skills, knowledge and financial resources that some 
smaller firms in the WestFocus sample possess. The fact that technology adoption patterns by the 
WestFocus sample as a whole are generally higher than relative levels of ‘written security policy’ use 
and ‘awareness training for IT security issues’, added to apparent resource constraints, may indicate 
that claims by Spinellis et al. (1999) that advanced technology outpaces the development of ‘control 
practice and employee knowledge’ have validity. Given that smaller firms are less likely to have a 
formal security policy than their larger equivalents, then it is possible to speculate further that smaller 
firms are more likely to have unsafe handling practices than larger firms.  
If technology providers fail to meet the needs of firms as Nathan et al. (2003) imply, then there is 
a role for government agencies to step into the market gap to help ensure firms handle data securely 
safely. Martin amd Matlay (2001) however assert that ‘there is an acute lack of engagement on behalf 
of small business owner/managers who are largely suspicious of government interference in industry’. 
Thus traditional business support mechanisms through which small firms can learn about security 
policy formation and safe data handling practice may fall short as a desired policy goal, as Simpson and 
Docherty (2004) intimate. The ‘cat-and-mouse’ struggles between those responsible for system security 
and those intent on exploiting security flaws, whether with criminal intent or otherwise, supports the 
case advocated by Standen and Sinclair-Jones (2003) for the use of ‘ethical hackers’ (i.e. trusted 
individuals and agencies who seek to test the security of systems in order to reveal security flaws to a 
target firm) by which firms can check their security posture. This is not a simple task given the 
variegation of devices and loci noted by which to access firms’ systems, and the ‘motivations, 
constraints and uncertainties’ (Westhead and Storey, 1996: p.18) experienced by small firms that 
includes ‘non-linear (and) sometimes chaotic behavior’ (Fillis et al. 2004). Thus, amongst other 
enquiries, such an initiative would require answers to the following questions: 
a) Can small firms afford such support, and if so, can they then be persuaded to make such an 
investment (especially those firms that may be in great need of such an offering but which show little 
inclination to seek out business support interventions)?  
b) How can small firms be sure of the bona fides of such individuals and agencies? 
c) How can small firms be persuaded that such individuals and agencies themselves are secure?  
 
Given the existing legal and administrative burdens already felt by SMEs struggling to survive in 
an increasingly competitive marketplace, there may be little apparent enthusiasm for yet another state-
sponsored instrument. Thus there may be a role for policy makers working with stakeholders to 
facilitate the development of an appropriate mechanism.  Use of some form of licensed ‘honest broker’ 
that enjoyed a level of independence from government would likely be required. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 This paper attempts to help fill a gap in the academic literature on data security issues in relation 
to electronically-mediated working by SMEs. Based on a telephone survey of 378 firms in West 
London and surrounding counties in early 2006 and managed by a WestFocus project team composed 
of researchers from Royal Holloway, Kingston and Brunel universities, this analysis attempts to 
explore technology adoption and threats to data security on the basis of the whole sample, and where 
possible on the basis of four industry sectors (‘Media’, ‘Logistics’, ‘Internet Services’ and ‘Food 
Processing’) and three firm sizes (‘Micro’, ‘Small’, and ‘Medium’) of SME. The small firms literature 
shows that data security is a subject mainly examined in combination with some other issue(s), and that 
there are few studies dedicated to security issues raised by telework per se. General findings on 
Internet-related technologies show that the basic infrastructure for secure distributed working and 
electronically-mediated trading is in place for the sample as a whole, even if the quality (or otherwise) 
of such an infrastructure cannot be ascertained.  
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Mirroring work on e-commerce adoption, evidence was found for differences in ‘offsite working’ 
on the basis of sector, and for data security practices on the basis of both sector and size. In terms of 
sector, ‘Internet Services’ demonstrated greatest attention to data security risks in terms of written 
security policies and provision of training for IT security awareness. Overall the other three sectors 
(‘Food Processing’, ‘Media’ and ‘Logistics’) came some way behind in these terms. Further sector 
behavior shows that ‘Food Processing’ firms appear to display different adoption behavior from the 
other sectors in regard to the relative balance between ‘offsite working’, use of a formal security policy 
and security training for employees. In terms of size, generally the smaller the firm, the lower the levels 
of written security policies and training in evidence, which chimes with work on e-commerce adoption. 
An apparent market failure allied with small firms’ distrust of state-sponsored business support 
mechanisms begs for new approaches in the promotion of data security. Use of ‘ethical hackers’ by 
‘honest brokers’ may be one approach deserving policy attention therefore. Nevertheless, whatever the 
relative merits and demerits of such a proposal, if teleworking and mobile working in general are to 
flourish amongst small firms, then greater research effort needs to be devoted to data security issues in 
the virtual domain that takes a small firm perspective.    
 
 
APPENDIX 1: Selected review of studies examining ICT adoption that highlights the relative 
level of discussion on security issues 
Author(s)             Description   Empirical Data Security 
Clear and 
Dickson (2005) 
UK study examining how adoption of 
telework is influenced more by 
management attitudes, levels of 
worker autonomy and employment 
flexibility than technology provision 
303 SME survey; 
58 face-to-face 
interviews 
Data security discussed only in 
terms of its being ‘a major 
disadvantage to the adoption of 
telework’ 
Dixon et al. 
(2002) 
Literature review providing a critique 
of research into ICT use by SMEs; 
examines UK policy and ICT targets; 
highlights UK regional and 
international differences in ICT 
adoption; maintains that influences of 
sector, age and firm size on ICT 
adoption is under-researched  
Reviews papers 
that use empirical 
data but no 
primary 
empirical data  
‘Security/privacy issues’ noted 
as one of a number of barriers to 
ICT adoption 
Fillis et al. 
(2004) 
UK study that examines factors 
promoting and inhibiting adoption of 
e-business; critiques stage models of 
adoption; findings show that sector 
has an important influence on e-
business development   
21 SMEs; 18 
face-to-face 
interviews; 3 
phone interviews 
‘Security issues’ mentioned as a 
possible impediment to future 
business development 
Gupta and 
Hammond 
(2005) 
US study examining information 
systems (including Internet 
technologies) security issues for 
‘small businesses’  
138 small 
business survey 
using US 
definition of 
SME (1-499 
employees) 
though only 6 
responses > 200  
Identifies security risks as 
perceived by small business 
owners, security incidents 
experienced by the sample and 
measures taken to guard against 
security threats; findings raised 
doubts about the effectiveness of 
security measures   
Levenburg 
(2005) 
US study examining how small firms 
use a range of ‘e-business’ tools in 
their supply chains; finds more 
extensive use of ICT tools in the 
supply chains of  ‘small’ and 
‘medium-sized’ firms rather than in 
‘micro’ firms, though when a ‘micro’ 
firm adopts ‘e-SCM’, ‘benefits are 
more pronounced’; finds that  ‘micro’ 
firms show different use behavior 
from ‘small’ and ‘medium’ firms 
395 SME survey No mention of security  
Levy and Powell 
(2003) 
UK study that critiques stage 
adoption models; argues for an 
alternative ‘transporter’ model which 
recognises the fact that at adoption 
behavior is contingent on perceived 
12 SME case 
studies 
Brief discussion that highlights 
the experience felt by one firm 
whose customers failed to use 
their web site due to a perceived 
security risk  
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business need; highlights owner 
attitude as instrumental in adoption 
decisions; identifies sector adoption 
behavior of firms   
MacGregor & 
Vrazalic (2005) 
Examines e-commerce adoption 
barriers amongst small firms in 
regions in Sweden and Australia; uses 
statistical methods by which to derive 
two fundamental factors affecting 
adoption: either firms find e-
commerce ‘too difficult,’ or 
‘unsuitable’ for their business, or 
both 
477 small firms 
survey 
‘Security’ seen as a barrier but 
its discussion is limited; 
discussed mostly in terms of its 
being a statistically-divergent 
artifact for Australian and 
Swedish adoption practice in the 
two factor model  
Martin and 
Matlay (2001) 
UK study that critiques government 
policy based on use of the DTI five-
stage ICT adoption model (developed 
by Cisco); seen as deficient due to its 
‘one-size-fits-all’ underpinning that is 
based on wholly linear progression 
and that ignores key influences such 
as sector, size, ethnicity, gender, 
human & financial resources, 
customer base and 
internationalisation   
No empirical 
data 
‘Security systems’ mentioned as 
part of a discussion on business 
support requirements for small 
firms 
Poon and 
Swatman (1999) 
Australian study that examines the 
benefits of ‘small business Internet 
commerce’; strong interest in email 
detected in firms but almost no 
integration between firms’ Internet 
use and internal systems found; 
highlights some sector influences  
23 small firms No mention of ‘security’ 
Quayle (2002) UK study that examines levels of 
awareness about e-commerce and 
levels of e-commerce adoption 
amongst SMEs 
298 small firms 
survey 
Mentions security in the 
literature review as one of a 
number of ‘hurdles’ to e-
commerce adoption 
Riemenschneider 
and McKinney 
(2002) 
Brief article reporting on a US study 
examining advantages and 
disadvantages of e-commerce 
adoption by adopting and non-
adopting firms  
27 telephone 
interviews and 
184 firm survey  
‘Lack of security regarding 
important information’ seen as 
one of four reported 
disadvantages, and a 
predominant concern for non-
adopters 
Shiels et al. 
(2003) 
UK study examining ICT adoption in 
firms in four sectors using an ‘ICT 
Exploitation and Integration Model’ 
which posits four levels of ICT 
sophistication: ‘technical integration’, 
‘operational integration’, ‘inter-
organisational integration’ and 
‘strategic integration’.  
24 SME case 
studies 
Mentions network security and 
security of back-ups in 
discussion of ‘technical 
integration’ 
 
Simpson and 
Docherty (2004) 
UK study examining barriers and 
drivers for e-commerce adoption; 
critical of UK business support 
mechanisms; argues SME distrust of 
government business support may 
allow third party vendors to exploit 
SME ignorance  
Small number 
(undefined) of 
interviews with 
owner-managers  
Security concerns noted as one 
of a number of barriers to e-
commerce adoption 
Spinellis et al. 
(1999) 
Conceptual study that examines 
security requirements for the ‘small 
enterprise’ and ‘home-office 
environments’; argues for use of risk 
analysis methodologies and uses two 
scenarios as exemplars by which to 
illustrate security threats; makes a 
series of recommendations for 
potential solutions to threats.  
No empirical 
data 
Focuses on security issues 
related to ‘small enterprises’ and 
home offices and notes that 
these can suffer serious security 
problems as they typically lack 
the technical expertise to create 
and maintain a suitable level of 
security. Finds that SMES  and 
home offices face similar levels 
of risk.  
Fintan Clear 
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Stockdale and 
Standing (2004) 
Australian study that identifies SME 
benefits and barriers to e-commerce 
No empirical 
data 
Security not mentioned 
Stockdale and 
Standing (2006) 
Australian study examining drivers 
and barriers for e-commerce 
adoption; draws up a typology of 
SME adopters  
Combination of 
secondary case 
study data and 
‘interactions’ 
with stakeholders 
‘Security and worries about 
fraud’ noted in a brief discussion 
on security issues  
Sturgeon (1996) US study that examines drivers for 
telework and the security threats and 
risks that it poses for firms (i.e. it 
does not focus on small firms per se), 
especially in terms of sensitive data. 
Written before wireless modes of 
communication became common 
though measures to manage risks 
appear valid still   
Uses small 
number of 
anonymised case 
studies to 
highlight 
vulnerabilities  
Focuses on threats to data 
security raised by telework 
under a taxonomy that includes 
‘disclosure’, ‘interruption’, 
‘modification’, ‘destruction’ and 
‘removal’; argues for risk 
assessment; recommends 
various types of measure to 
manage threats  
Taylor and 
Murphy (2004) 
UK study that critiques DTI adoption 
model echoing Martin and Matlay 
(2001) and argues for the use of the 
PITs model (Foley and Ram, 2002); 
discusses barriers to adoption and 
tries to identify factors that promote 
‘successful adoption of e-business 
technologies’ 
Discusses 
empirical data 
provided by other 
researchers 
As a barrier to entry into the 
digital economy, notes there are 
perceptions of unresolved 
security and privacy issues 
which most acutely identifies 
online payment and which 
discourage small firm adoption 
of ‘this technology’ and e-
business 
Van Beveren and 
Thomson (2002) 
Brief paper reporting on an 
Australian study that highlights firm 
size as a factor that influences e-
commerce adoption    
179 SME survey 
of manufacturers 
No mention of ‘security’ 
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